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The partitioning of British India in August 1947 into its principal successor state, Hindu-majority India, 
and newly formed Muslim-majority Pakistan, like many of the now infamous partitions of the 
twentieth century, did not take place without considerable humanitarian turmoil. Indeed, a 
communal genocide of provincial and district minority populations, together with a huge transfer of 
population to and fro the two dominions, preceded, accompanied and followed the official Partition. 
This paper focuses upon the ‘memory’ of this episode as held by one of its participant groups—the 
Sikh refugees—who migrated from the territory of prospective/realised West Pakistan into truncated 
India. This paper contends that the Sikh refugees have sought to convey, through their memory of 
this episode, that ‘their people’ were the foremost victims of Partition. This is both in terms of the 
associated violence and the long-term material consequences deriving from being driven out of their 
‘homelands’. 
 
 
Having been targeted for, first, objecting to the Muslim League’s Pakistan demand, and then, 
second, supporting the division of Punjab so as to salvage the eastern portion for India, the 
Sikhs, together with the Hindus, belonging to the Muslim-majority districts of west Punjab and 
the other territories of prospective/realised West Pakistan, succumbed to the wrath of Muslim 
mob attacks at the time of ‘Partition’.1 Direct or indirect victims of physical violence, murder, 
rape, forcible conversion, loot and plunder of their assets, defilement of their holy sites; the 
Sikhs that had managed to reach the ‘safe-haven’ of truncated India, as with other refugee 
groups of Partition, held, what this paper terms to be, a ‘victimhood-rich’ memory of Partition 
(with the ‘victimhood-rich’ element to their memory being further accentuated by, in many 
cases, the detrimental long-term consequences deriving from the division). 
                                                
1 For the purposes of this paper, the timespan of ‘Partition’ relates to the period between late 1946 and 
early 1948. 
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Notwithstanding the ‘involuntary’ nature of traumatic neuroses (Freud 1955: 13), it appears 
that there has been a conscious attempt by many Sikh refugees to maintain and evoke a memory 
of Partition that is, in its shape, suggestive of ‘their people’ being the foremost victims of 
Partition. In terms of why any group would want to promote such an idea extends beyond the 
common impulse of wanting to ‘feel sorry for themselves’, but serves one or a combination of 
the following three objectives, with the first being a more practical objective and the latter two 
more egotistical. These are; (1) it strengthens their ability to extract concessions and support 
from their host society, be it from non-refugee ethnic kin or the government; (2) it justifies, for 
some, their destitute status for which a non-refugee of a similar status would likely be 
stigmatized; and (3) it demonstrates, for the large numbers of those that have ‘succeeded’ socio-
economically since then, their sheer heroism by reaching such heights in spite of their destitute 
status at the time of Partition. This paper, therefore, identifies and summarises the validity of 
the common aspects emerging from the Sikh refugee memory of Partition which serve to support 
their claim of being the foremost victims. 
 
Distinctively ‘Sikh’ Edge to the Memory of Partition Violence 
Sikh refugees have sought to maintain and strengthen the ‘usability’ (Zamora 1998) of their 
‘victimhood-rich’ partition memory by demonstrating (or at least insinuating) that they, as a sub-
group, and part of a wider pan-ethnic collective, were the foremost victims of the Partition 
violence. In an interview with this author, Paramjit Singh Sarna, a Delhi-based refugee 
originally from Gujar Khan, Rawalpindi district, stated that, ‘[the Sikhs] lost ten times more 
people to the Muslims than the amount of Muslims [the Sikhs] killed’.2 Similarly, Davinder 
Singh, a Jat refugee from a canal colonist family in Sheikhupura but now living in Ludhiana, 
stated that 
 
[w]e suffered the most deaths during Partition by far, no doubt about it…but then again I suppose 
you could say that it is hardly surprising, if you look at Sikh history from the time of our Gurus till 
now, you can say it is almost our destiny to die a violent death.3 
 
Sikh Refugees versus Hindu Refugees 
There are a number of explanations that Sikh refugees have advanced for why they suffered 
more Partition violence compared to the Hindu refugees, who also fled from West Pakistan. 
One explanation maintains that the historical animosity that had existed between Sikhs and the 
Muslims meant that the latter had fewer reservations about engaging in violence against the 
former. This view is reflected in a statement by Vachan Kaur, an Amritsar-based refugee 
originally from Shahpur Kanjra, Lahore district: 
 
                                                
2 Interview with Paramjit Singh Sarna, Delhi, 21 August 2010. 
3 Interview with Davinder Singh, Ludhiana, 2 September 2010. 
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There was a lot of hatred among Sikhs and Muslims. It was easier for the Hindus to come and go. 
There was hate for them also, but not like it was between Sikhs and Muslims (quoted in Verma 2004: 
134). 
 
While the antagonism that existed between the Sikhs and Muslims of Punjab during this 
period probably did exceed that between the Hindus and Muslims, one of the chief reasons for 
this—the perception that the ‘other group’ were unduly aggressive in nature—may actually 
have deterred some Muslim mobs from attacking the Sikhs as opposed to the Hindus, the latter 
of whom were apparently more ‘cowardly’ and thus thought to possess less aptitude for 
avenging any such assaults. 
A second explanation for why the Sikh refugees supposedly suffered more violence than 
the Hindu ones was that it had been the Sikhs who had been most vocally opposed to the 
prospective Muslim League-led ministry in Punjab (and wider Pakistan scheme) and as such 
were obvious targets for the Muslims’ wrath. This is reflected in the two statements below: 
 
[It] cannot be denied that the main target of [the March 1947] attack were the Sikhs. It is suggested 
that the reason for this was the Muslim League thought that the Sikhs were the principal obstacle in 
the formation of the League Ministry, and if they had joined hands with it or even if they had 
refrained from co-operation with the Hindus, it would have easily formed a Ministry on its own 
[emphasis added].4 
 
The Sikhs had opposed the partition of India with even greater vigour than the Hindus, because they 
felt as a community they could only expect disaster in Pakistan; it was therefore, against the Sikhs 
that the spear point of the Muslim League attack was first aimed. In the March riots, the Sikhs of 
Rawalpindi faced annihilation and a large number of them left the district [emphasis added] (G. D. 
Kholsa quoted in Randhawa 1954: 13). 
 
Admittedly, it is difficult to deny that the Sikhs, as demonstrated by the language (often 
quite provocative) used by senior Akalis,5 were the group most virulently opposed to the 
formation of the Muslim League ministry and the Pakistan demand. 
A third explanation advanced is that the ‘Sikhs were obvious targets of the 
Muslims...because of their beards...otherwise Hindus and Muslims looked the same, so in that 
way possibly the Sikhs suffered the most’.6 Although those Keshdharis among the Sikhs were 
undoubtedly easier to identify from the Muslim mobs’ point of view as  belonging to an ‘enemy 
religion’, it also meant that they were also able to gain the protection of their co-religionists a 
lot easier in high intensity situations. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable for refugees to conclude
                                                
4 ‘Statement of Justice Teja Singh’. Boundary Commission: Partition Proceedings vol. 2, Acc No. 1634 [Prof 
Kirpal Singh’s Manuscript Collection, Khalsa College, Amritsar], p. 101. 
5 Giving an idea as to the heartfelt Sikh objections in this regard, Master Tara Singh suggested in early March 
1947 that his community, with ‘unanimous determination…oppose the formation of the Muslim League Ministry 
in the Punjab which has for its object the achievement of Pakistan or the domination of the Punjab’, before going 
on to say, ‘let the Khalsa Panth now realise the gravity of the situation. I expect every Sikh to do his duty. We shall 
live or die but not submit to Muslim domination’ [emphasis added] (The Tribune, 4 March 1947). 
6 Interview with Kuldip Nayar, Delhi, 29 August 2010. 
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that, aside from a few Sikh majority pockets within west Punjab, being a Keshdhari served to 
increase the chance of their becoming victims of mob attacks. 
 
Pan-Sikh Collective versus Pan-Muslim Collective 
Since it was clear that Muslims were by most accounts the principal aggressors in West Pakistan, 
there is often very little reason for Sikh refugees, with their ‘victimhood-rich’ narrative, to 
identify with or appropriate aspects (through a ‘backwash effect’)7 of the Partition memory of 
their non-refugee co-religionists in the east.8 However Sikh refugees have occasionally been, 
somewhat reluctantly, dragged into the wider cross-Wagah debate about which community 
suffered the most violence at a pan-collective level. Yet even on such occasions, the Sikh 
refugees have still maintained the claim that their pan-collective suffered more Partition-related 
violence than the Muslims. This is based on a number of claims.  
One claim is that their demographic distribution, i.e. the fact that they were thinly spread 
across the subcontinent but relatively concentrated in the territories of Punjab, resulted in Sikhs 
suffering the most deaths out of any community. In support of this point, pro-Khalistani9 Dr 
Gurmit Singh Aulakh, a Jat refugee from a canal colonist family in Lyallpur (now Faisalabad) 
but now living in Washington D. C., remarks: 
 
I think the Sikhs were the ones who suffered the most…loss of life…because more of us 
migrated…Hindus and Muslims were only a small fraction of the transfer of population [as per their 
pan-collective numbers across the subcontinent]…we [the Sikhs] were the majority of the transfer 
of population [proportionately]…we covered the most.10 
 
Though it is undoubtedly the case that the bulk of the Sikh population were concentrated 
within Punjab and that this province probably witnessed the greatest upheaval out of any in 
united India (thus making the Sikhs proportionally the largest victims in this respect), it is also 
the case that the Sikhs were also proportionally more likely to participate in Partition-related 
crimes than any other. However, under such charges, the Sikh refugees could disassociate from 
their non-refugee ethnic kin, and thus maintain the purity of their ‘victimhood-rich’ memory. 
A second claim is that Muslims believed the killing of kafirs (non-believers) to be a virtuous 
deed, whereas the Sikhs and Hindus were supposedly more ‘moral’ and, thus, reluctant 
participants in the violence. Granting there have been many Muslim extremists who have 
historically considered the killing and conversion of kafirs to be righteous, it is purely a matter 
of one’s own subjective opinion as to whether Sikhs, or for that matter Hindus, were any more 
principled in their conduct during the Partition massacres. 
                                                
7 ‘Backwash-effect’ relates to aspects of the non-refugee event-related experience, in this case Partition, which 
the refugees appropriate into their own memory of their exile. 
8 Since by doing so would typically weaken, if not virtually eradicate, their ability to view their collective as 
victims of Partition. 
9 ‘Khalistani’ is a term associated with those Sikhs that support the concept of Khalistan, that is to say the 
secession of Sikh-majority Punjab from the rest of India. 
10 Interview with Dr Gurmit Singh Aulakh [Phone Interview], 21 February 2011. 
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A third claim Sikh refugees advance for why they suffered the more Partition-related 
violence than the Muslims is that the disturbances in Punjab were part of a wider Muslim-led 
plan (inclusive of the Muslim League, their affiliated press and paramilitary organisations) to 
exterminate, or at least expel, non-Muslims from prospective/realised Pakistani territory. This 
view is reflected in the cross-section of Sikh refugee views from 1947 to the present that are 
offered below: 
 
The relations between the two communities [Muslims and non-Muslims] got embittered due to the 
communal virus spread by the Muslim Leaguers.11 
 
The very name of the State which the Muslim League envisaged—and achieved—is, in the 
context in which it was adopted, a standing insult to the Hindus and other non-Muslims living 
in India. The name—Pakistan—means literally ‘the Land of the Pure’ or of Purity. This implies 
clearly that Hindus and all that belongs to them…[is] impure, defiled and unholy. In a 
communally-charged atmosphere to have broadcast such an offensive name and concept 
among the Muslims was to extend an open invitation to racial and communal arrogance (Talib 
[1950] 1991: 2-3). 
Since the Muslim League had proclaimed that Pakistan was to be the homeland of the 
Muslims, it had to compensate its supporters with jobs, if necessary at the expense of the non-
Muslims (Khushwant Singh 1965: 12). 
 
Before [Partition] there was the news that although Pakistan had been created the Muslims there in 
India would live there [in India] and the Hindus and Sikhs on the Pakistan side could stay on in 
Pakistan. But Jinnah said it could not be allowed and that each man should come to within his own 
boundaries. It was after this that we started [migrating] [emphasis added] (Sikh refugee #16 quoted 
in Keller 1975: 45). 
 
The killing was on all sides…but it was the Muslim League, and their conspiracy, that triggered it 
all…they called it Direct Action…and they started by going after Sikhs and Hindus wherever they 
could.12 
 
Arguably, the Sikh refugee memory in this respect is partly a defensive reaction to the 
‘competing history’ (Linenthal and Engelhardt 1996) from Pakistan that it was, in fact, a ‘Sikh 
                                                
11 ‘Memo: Akbar Virkan Village, Gujranwala District, Disturbances’, Fact Finding Branch, Ministry of Relief & 
Rehabilitation, Government of India, New Delhi, 3 May 1948, Acc No. 1415 [Prof Kirpal Singh’s Manuscript 
Collection, Khalsa College, Amritsar], p. 36. 
12 Interview with Tarlochan Singh, Delhi, 19 August 2010. 
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conspiracy’13 which triggered the violence across Punjab. In fact, the political leadership of 
both the Muslim League14 and the SAD15 not only repeatedly promoted the idea of transfer of 
population but also often instigated the violence used to achieve that goal. Of course this is not 
to say that the Hindus of Punjab did not play a role in expelling Muslims from east Punjab and 
the Sikh states (henceforth simply ‘east Punjab’) or other parts of India, but only that they as a 
community had, rationally speaking, the least to gain through any exchange of population both 
in socio-economic and political terms. 
A fourth claim is that the Punjab police, largely fractured along communal lines during the 
partition violence,16 were dominated by Muslim officers. Amar Singh Bains, an Amritsar-based 
refugee originally from Pakpattan, Montgomery district, states that 
 
the Punjab police force at the time was manned overwhelmingly by Mussulmans…and as you must 
be knowing, the force became utterly communalised at that time…They confiscated our weapons 
that were for the defence of our people under the pretext that we [Sikhs] may create trouble…This 
left us completely exposed to the raiders with whom many [police officers] joined in with the looting 
and plundering.17 
 
While there were indeed more Muslim officers within the Punjab Police than any other 
community, it must be said that most of those serving east of the Radcliffe Line were actually 
non-Muslim. However, from a pan-Punjab perspective it is likely the non-Muslims suffered 
marginally more of a disadvantage in this respect. 
A final claim, in common with a view shared by many Hindus across India, is that the 
British had a pro-Muslim bias (or at least a pro-Pakistan one),18 which led them to mildly 
                                                
13 It was suggested by a series of publications produced by the Pakistani state in 1948 that the responsibility for 
the violence across Punjab lay with the Sikhs and their alleged ‘conspiracy’, namely ‘the establishment of Sikh rule 
in the Punjab’ for which ‘their preparations…were aimed directly and exclusively against the Muslims’ [emphasis 
added] (‘Note of the Sikh Plan’, Acc No. 1517 [Prof Kirpal Singh’s Manuscript Collection, Khalsa College, 
Amritsar], p. 1). Unsurprisingly many Sikh leaders have since, refugees and non-refugees alike, categorically 
refuted any such idea of a ‘Sikh Conspiracy’ (‘Interview with Naranjan Singh Gill conducted by S. L. Manchanda’, 
Delhi, 11 April 1972, Acc No. 168 [Oral History Collection, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New 
Delhi], p. 116).  
14 This includes the likes of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and Sir Feroze Khan Noon to name but a few. 
15 Once again senior leaders, this time belonging to the SAD, none less than Master Tara Singh advocated 
exchange of population as a permanent solution to the Sikhs’ problem (The Tribune, 4 May 1947). Also, most 
objective readings regarding the Partition violence have shown that the SAD, and affiliated bodies such as the Akal 
Fauj, played a lead-role in massacring and expelling innocent Muslims across east Punjab. Indeed, according to 
Brass, Master Tara Singh himself admitted in conversation, that: ‘We took the decision to turn the Muslims out’ 
(Brass 2003: 77). 
16 See ‘Statement of Sobha Singh regarding Lyallpur Disturbances’. 28 March 1948, Acc No. 1405 [Prof Kirpal 
Singh’s Manuscript Collection, Khalsa College, Amritsar], p. 110; see also ‘Memo: Akalgarh Town, Gujranwala 
District, Disturbances’, Fact Finding Branch, Ministry of Relief & Rehabilitation, Government of India, New Delhi, 
12 April 1948, Acc No. 1415 [Prof Kirpal Singh’s Manuscript Collection, Khalsa College, Amritsar], p. 3. 
17 Interview with Amar Singh Bains, Amritsar, 16 September 2010. 
18 According to a former MLA of British Punjab who fled Lahore after the Partition riots: ‘The British were holding 
Pakistan up to some extent and, therefore, to hold it up, they had to be slightly anti-India, otherwise if they had 
been pro-India, Pakistan would not have come in’ (‘Interview with Surjit Singh Majithia conducted by S. L. 
Manchanda’, Delhi, 14 June 1973, Acc No. 668 [Oral History Collection, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Museum & 
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endorse or turn a blind eye towards anti-Muslim outrages across West Pakistan. While 
conclusions about whether or not the British had a pro-Muslim/Pakistan bias is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it is clear that it was virtually impossible for the various communities of 
Punjab (and much less so across India) to be were awarded completely equal treatment by the 
Raj, nor can it be said that all British officials could have thought or acted alike. 
 
Long-Term Consequences of Partition 
The view that the Sikh refugees, and to a lesser degree the Sikhs as a pan-collective, suffered 
the most in terms of the nature and scale of partition violence appears to be consistent with the 
prevailing assessment within their memory that, in sum, ‘the Sikhs were the worst losers of 
Partition’.19 Having discussed, in some detail, the violence associated with their departure, we 
now consider other reasons, economic, political and cultural, Sikh refugees perceive their 
community as suffering the most from Partition. 
 
Economic Consequences of Partition 
The Sikh refugee memory tends to assume that their people suffered the largest fiscal ‘step-
down’ with respect to their pre- and post-partition livelihoods.20 A statement by Tarlochan 
Singh, a Delhi-based refugee, originally from Dhudial, Jhelum district, provides an example of 
this:  
 
There’s absolutely no comparison [between life in west Punjab and east Punjab]. You see over there 
we were rich, we were the landholders, we had better agricultural facilities and techniques…we 
had large bungalows…and then to come to the east, where the people were backward, and very 
poor…and we joined them in their poverty…I was working on the streets, doing all sorts of child 
labour…from the age of thirteen, I was working hard.21 
 
Similarly, Kuldip Nayar, another Delhi-based refugee, originally from Sialkot, suggests that 
out of the transfer of population, 
 
the Muslims fared better…you see when they left India they had only land...so you can say there’s 
was a step-up…[Yet in Indian Punjab] there were many homes that were vacated…these were
                                                
Library, New Delhi], p. 89). Perhaps one credible way of assessing whether or not the British held a pro-Muslim 
bias would be to record the proportion of Muslims/non-Muslims who, in accordance with their respective 
populations across India, were knighted or honoured by the crown. 
19 All refugees interviewed by this study, as well as all post-event offspring, articulated words to this effect. Such 
a view has also been expressed in works written by both refugee and non-refugee Sikhs (See Gill 1975: 63; 
Khushwant Singh 1984; Nayar and Khushwant Singh 1984: 21; Dhillon 1994: 249). 
20 In his study on the Sikh refugees, which compromised 73 interviews with members of this sub-group, Stephen 
Keller remarked that, ‘not one of the refugees, in designating the changes that had occurred in his life on this side 
of the border (as contrasted with his life in west Punjab), remarked that he was materially better off than he had 
been on the other side of the border’ (Keller 1975: 85). 
21 Interview with Tarlochan Singh, Delhi, 19 August 2010. 
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Muslim evacuee homes, though they were smaller than we had been used to, these were filled by 
Hindu and Sikh refugees [emphasis added].22 
 
In addition, these views, there are a number of other popularly-held views as to why Sikh 
refugees suffered the most in this respect. One relates to ‘non-Muslim’ dominance of 
commercial centres across West Pakistan. 23 So, for instance, Sarna suggests that one of the 
chief reasons for Muslim support for the Pakistan demand was that  
 
[b]efore partition, Hindus, and Sikhs too, used to own all the businesses…even though Muslims 
were the majority; they only owned ten per cent of the businesses…so that’s why they [the Muslims] 
were resentful.24  
 
Although there is much truth in the view that non-Muslims were dominant in trading centres 
across West Pakistan, it was mainly the Hindus who were so. This perhaps why Sikh refugees, 
in a bid to extract sufficient ‘usability’ from this aspect of their partition memory, tend to speak 
of a joint ‘Hindu and Sikh contribution’.25 Such apparent shifts in group identification are 
possible because ‘every individual belongs to numerous…groups and therefore entertains 
numerous self-images and memories’ from which to draw upon (Assmann 1995: 127).  
Another popularly-held view that contributing towards the conviction that Sikh refugees 
suffered the most economically is that, while Sikhs were responsible for transforming the largely 
barren wastelands of central Punjab into the most fertile and productive agricultural land in the 
country, i.e. the ‘canal colonies’, all nine of these colonies ended up in Pakistan (Krishan 2004: 
80). Admittedly, the view that the Sikhs were responsible for the success of the canal colonies 
is one that was articulated both in the period shortly before the partition of Punjab/India as well 
as in the subsequent decades. 
Before partition, this view was expressed in the following statements: 
 
It is significant that only those districts and regions of the Punjab, which are mainly cultivated by 
the Sikh farmers, are the surplus food districts…By sheer dint of their hard work, the Sikhs have not 
only made barren and waste lands fertile but also have created an insatiable desire amongst the 
Punjabis for canal-irrigated land which has incidentally raised the price of land (Harnam Singh 
1945: 64-65). 
 
Sikhs are the best farmers in India and are in fact the only successful colonisers of new lands. By 
their hard work they have made the deserts of Montgomery and Lyallpore blossom into a peasant’s 
paradise (Gyani Kartar Singh 1947: 2). 
                                                
22 Interview with Kuldip Nayar, Delhi, 29 August 2010. 
23 Such a view was subscribed to, and expounded, by prospective refugees among the Sikhs in the months prior 
to Partition, in the hope the British adjudicators would extend east Punjab territory over majority Muslim districts 
(‘Copy of Resolution of Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Saugor’. 10 July 1947, FN 2-B/47 [RPP], p. 9). 
24 Interview with Paramjit Singh Sarna, Delhi, 21 August 2010. 
25 It is accurate to say, that Sikh refugees have tended to refer to this aspect of their economic loss, which 
inevitably highlights Hindu Partition suffering as a consequence, mainly during periods when Hindu-Sikh relations 
have remained cordial. 
2016   |   The South Asianist 4 (2): 62-77   |   pg. 71 
 
After partition: 
 
The two and half millions that were expelled from Pakistan had been the richest peasantry of India 
owning large estates in the canal colonies (Khushwant Singh 1984: 6). 
 
We Sikhs had built up those canal colonies through our own hard toil and painstaking efforts…My 
grandfather was one of the early ones to go over [from east Punjab] and take a gamble on 
transforming these jungles into productive lands…and then to have been driven from our homes, 
our livelihoods…by the communal poison unleashed upon us by those politicians and other self-
seeking persons, sitting in the comfort of their homes in places far away…well you can guess how 
painful it was for us.26 
 
However, this view might be challenged by pointing out that Sikhs only became 
agriculturalists in these areas in the first place because they were ‘awarded’ those plots by the 
British. In fact, a Delhi-based refugee originally from Haripur, NWFP, conceded that ‘the British 
made us [Sikhs] the landowners in the years after they annexed the Punjab’.27 However, given 
post-Partition trends, there is no evidence to suggest that Muslim or Hindu farmers, even had 
they been awarded such land grants, would have wielded equal pastoral aptitude to that shown 
by the Sikhs.  
A third reason advanced for why Sikhs were relatively more disadvantaged economically 
by Partition is that, because a larger proportion of their pan-collective suffered dislocation 
relative to the other groups, and since they were moving from a relatively sparsely-populated 
area to a dense one, the Sikhs suffered more graded land-cuts and/or landlessness in post-
Partition India than any other group.28 Based on 1941 Census of India information (albeit not 
entirely reliable data), Sikhs as a pan-collective did indeed suffer proportionally the more 
dislocation, both at the level of Punjab and all-India. However, if we focus absolute numbers, 
rather than proportion of the population, it is clear that there were actually far more Hindu and 
Muslim refugees than there were Sikhs. This is a rare instance in which it has made sense for 
the Sikh refugees to elide their partition memory with the wider pan-Sikh one, so as to constitute 
the biggest victims. 
 
Political Consequences of Partition
                                                
26 Interview with Amar Singh Bains, Amritsar, 16 September 2010. 
27 Interview with Dr Mohinder Singh, Delhi, 21 August 2010. 
28 All refugees interviewed by this study articulated words to this effect. Of course, such grievance is not without 
foundation, since, ‘As against an area of 67 lakh acres of land abandoned by the Hindu-Sikh landowners in West 
Pakistan, only 47 lakh acres were available in East Punjab. The gap in area was not bad enough but the position 
was actually much worse when we consider the factors like fertility of soil and means of irrigation. The Hindu-
Sikh land-owners left 43 lakh acres of irrigated land as against 13 lakh acres of irrigated land left by the Muslims. 
Out of the irrigated area left in West Pakistan by the Hindu-Sikh refugees, 22 lakh acres were perennially irrigated 
as against only 4 lakh acres of such land left by the Muslims in East Punjab’ (Randhawa quoted in Keller 1975: 
viii). 
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In addition to the economic consequences of partition, the Sikh refugees tend to hold that they, 
and their wider pan-ethnic community, bore the heaviest political costs from the Partition. It 
should be noted that these political consequences probably are among the most malleable 
aspect of the Sikh refugee memory. Consequently, the discussion here will restrict itself to only 
analysing those aspects which have remained largely unchanged since 1947. These include the 
following two commonly expressed, but somewhat contradictory, views.  
One view is that, irrespective of whether or not they agreed with the decision to partition 
Punjab and/or India, the Radcliffe Line which cut across Punjab was unjust and, specifically, 
did not extend far west enough.29 Sikh refugees have sensible grounds for this claim; (1) the 
1941 census figures used to ascertain majority Muslim and non-Muslim areas across Punjab 
were, despite being highly suspect,30 taken as authoritative by the Boundary Commission;31 (2) 
in the months prior to the partition of Punjab/India being officially agreed upon in June 1947, 
the non-Muslim population between the Chenab and Ravi (territories that ended up in Pakistan) 
had materially increased owing to refugee movements from the March 1947 disturbances, and 
thus the 1941 census figures were even less representative of the ‘facts on the ground’ (The 
Division of the Punjab 1947: 3); (3) the non-Muslims of Punjab were effectively awarded less 
than 38 per cent of the territory of British Punjab despite constituting approximately 43 per cent 
of its population, and less than 43 per cent of the entire Punjab inclusive of the princely states 
despite constituting over 47 per cent of its total population;32 and (4) the ‘other factors’33 which 
Cyril Radcliffe was supposed to take into consideration, did not appear to have made a 
significant difference to the ultimate boundary line.34  
                                                
29 While all Sikh refugees could credibly express regret at the outcome of the Radcliffe Line, clearly those living 
in districts adjoining to the new Indian border (as opposed to those from places such as Attock and further afield) 
held greater grounds to do so. This was because those areas actually held a more ‘realistic’ chance of being 
awarded to India given that they inhabited a more substantial non-Muslim population, more of their religious sites 
and landed property etc. A boundary line extending further west then had transpired, perhaps closer to the Chenab 
for example, would have benefitted those Sikhs living in outlying western districts only from the point of view that 
they would have had less ‘enemy territory’ to cross before reaching India. 
30 Concerns that the 1941 census Punjab population figures had been duped in favour of the Muslim count were 
expressed by a number of Sikhs in the lead up to Partition (see Harnam Singh 1947: 65; see also ‘Copy of 
Resolution of Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Saugor’, 10 July 1947, FN 2-B/47 [RPP], p. 5, 14). Even Oskar 
Spate, openly in favour of the Muslim case in Punjab, admitted that sections of the 1941 census were ‘grossly 
inaccurate’ (1947: 201, 208). 
31 See The Tribune, 5 June 1947. 
32 These are based on the 1941 census figures which, as mentioned, were almost certainly not an accurate 
depiction of the numerical strength of the respective communities across Punjab. As such the ‘disjuncture’ between 
land awarded and population, was likely far wider in reality than these figures suggest. 
33 According to its terms of reference: ‘The Boundary Commission is instructed to demarcate the boundaries of 
the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. 
In doing so it will also take into account other factors’ (‘Statement of Justice Teja Singh’. Boundary Commission: 
Partition Proceedings vol. 2, Acc No. 1634 [Prof Kirpal Singh’s Manuscript Collection, Khalsa College, Amritsar], 
p. 81). Naturally, Hindus and Sikhs believed that the division of Punjab along communal lines alone would be 
prejudicial to their interests and hence lobbied to include ‘other factors’ which they may have assumed would 
incorporate items such as land ownership, historical sites, geographical boundaries etc. 
34 The Pakistani state line in this respect has tended to hold that India was unfairly awarded with Gurdaspur 
district despite its 51 per cent Muslim majority (as per the 1941 census). It must be said that India did not gain/retain 
the full district, only the majority (with most of its Shakargarh tehsil going to Pakistan), furthermore the district-
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However, it is clear that there are important points which the Sikh refugees have, in order 
to maintain an untarnished ‘victimhood-rich’ narrative, conveniently ignored or at least 
downplayed. This adds sustenance to Pierre Nora’s claim that memory ‘only accommodates 
those facts that suit it’ (Nora 1989: 8). For the Sikh refugees, the facts that do not suit their 
‘victimhood-narrative’ include; (1) not all non-Muslims were necessarily in favour of union with 
India over Pakistan (though they were evidently treated as such by Radcliffe);35 (2) the non-
Muslim population (particularly the Sikhs) were more thinly spread across Punjab compared to 
the Muslim one, hence making it difficult to draw a border which would be more reflective of 
their pan-Punjab population; (3) that the Sikh leadership (and admittedly the INC too), while 
they managed to include ‘other factors’ in the official criteria for the division, failed to specify 
its prescribed weight. Moreover, they even agreed with a Muslim League memorandum that 
stated, the boundary 
 
should be a workable and practicable boundary from the point of view of administration 
and…should not be a crazy line running backwards and forwards over the areas of several districts 
and in and out of every village in those districts so as to result not in the separation of the two parts 
of Province which might each be constituted into a Province.36 
 
By agreeing with this memorandum, the Sikh (and Hindu) leadership effectively ‘shot 
themselves in the foot’ when trying to make the case for potential corridors linking important 
non-Muslim cultural sites, such as Nankana Sahib, with truncated Indian territory; and (4) the 
Sikh leadership’s continual indecisiveness and confusion as to their political demands in the 
lead up to Partition—whether they wanted i) an autonomous/independent Azad Punjab in 
which they would constitute a minority but hold a legislative ‘balance of power’ between the 
three main communities, ii) an independent Khalistan, iii) to join Pakistan, or iv) push for a 
divided Punjab in order to join partitioned India (and if the latter specifying their preference for 
where the boundary should rest)37—arguably weakened their bargaining position vis-à-vis the 
British. 
There is second commonly-held view as to why their people bore the heaviest political 
costs from Partition. This is the view that the Sikhs were the only community, recognised as 
such by the British imperial overlords, not to secure anything tangible as a result of the
                                                
level was never taken as the basic unit of division and even if it had been, then surely the Indian side had even 
more of a gripe to pick with the Boundary Award given that the Chittagong Hill Tracts, with its 97 per cent non-
Muslim majority, was awarded to East Pakistan (After Partition 1948: 31). 
35 For instance, many Christian Punjabis preferred to remain in, or migrate to, Pakistan. 
36 Quoted in ‘Statement of Mehr Chand Mahajan’, Boundary Commission: Partition Proceedings vol. 2, Acc No. 
1634 [Prof Kirpal Singh’s Manuscript Collection, Khalsa College, Amritsar], p. 12. 
37 It is clear that the Sikhs were internally torn between calling for the Boundary Line to be drawn along the 
Jhelum, Chenab or the Ravi (See ‘Letter to Sir Stafford Cripps from Master Tara Singh’, 30 May 1942, Acc No. 2018 
[Prof Kirpal Singh’s Manuscript Collection, Khalsa College, Amritsar]; see Hindustan Times, 11 June 1946; see The 
Tribune, 9 January 1947 and 3 May 1947; see also Gyani Kartar Singh 1947: 3, 9). Arguably, none displayed more 
confusion in this respect than Master Tara Singh himself. 
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division.38 The Sikhs were given neither a political entity nor constitutional guarantees regarding 
the security of their communal autonomy. The deep-felt sense of injustice in this regard is aptly 
conveyed by Master Tara Singh’s now infamous statement of 1961: ‘The Hindus got Hindustan, 
the Muslims got Pakistan, what did the Sikhs get?’ This statement is constantly paraphrased by 
Sikhs (especially those with a communal and/or Khalistani political leaning). Consider the 
following statements by Sikh interviewees: 
 
[After Partition] circumstances for the Hindus had changed that they became masters. Things had 
changed for the Muslims that they got Pakistan, but the Sikhs did not get anything at all [emphasis 
added].39 
 
It [Partition] was a betrayal of the Sikhs…we, having been rulers of Punjab prior to the British taking 
it in trust, were left to beg like dogs for scraps from the likes of the Congress when they [the British] 
left…and to compound it all, the Hindus they got their Hindustan, the Muslims, they got their 
Pakistan and, let me say some of the most fertile lands which we had created single handed…and 
the Sikhs, well…what did we get?...After independence we had to fight for years just to obtain a 
linguistic state even…Yet, in spite of this we continued to make unparalleled contribution to India 
in all wars, in Kashmir [1947-1948], 1962, 1965, then Bangladesh [war in 1971]…only to get our 
long awaited recognition from the Brahmin rulers in the form of the rape of our most precious 
site…Harmindar Sahib…our Vatican [emphasis added].40 
 
I think proportionately we were massively hit more than the other communities…but I think there’s 
something…even more unjust about [Partition] if you’re looking at it from the perspective of the 
losses of the groups involved, and that is that the Hindus got Hindustan, the Muslims got Pakistan, 
and the Sikhs got nothing [emphasis added].41 
 
This point of view has credible basis since the INC and the AIML, recognised as having the 
mandate of the franchised Hindus and Muslims, were awarded with Hindustan/truncated India 
and Pakistan respectively. However, it still merits scrutiny. It might be argued, for instance, that; 
(1) the Hindus did not actually get ‘Hindustan’42 at all, but in fact India remained a ‘secular’, 
                                                
38 Demonstrating this point, an Amritsar-based refugee originally from Malkpur, Lyallpur district, remarked that, 
‘Sikhs did not get anything except suffering out of all this migration. If the Sikhs had got something, we could have 
lived as far as Nankana Sahib’ (‘Interview with Kuljeet Kaur conducted by Prof Ian Talbot’, Amritsar, 19 February 
2003, quoted in Talbot and Tatla 2006: 140). Though constituting a core component of the Sikh refugee memory, 
such associated grievances are found within the non-refugee Sikhs’ memory of partition—and for good reason, 
given that the inability of the SAD to secure anything ‘tangible’ as a result of partition impacted the non-refugees 
as much as it did refugees. It is probably only those refugees that had held political or administrative posts within 
west Punjab/West Pakistan who could credibly claim to have suffered more in this respect than their non-refugee 
co-religionists in the east. 
39 ‘Interview with Hukum Singh conducted by S. L. Manchanda’, New Delhi, 4 April 1976. Acc No.344 [Oral 
History Collection, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi], p. 72. 
40 Interview with Avtar Singh Kohli, Amritsar, 19 September 2010. 
41 Interview with Ranjit Singh Srai [Phone Interview], 29 May 2011. 
42 While we can appreciate the multiple connotations associated with this term, it should be noted that in mid-
twentieth century Indian politics it became increasingly synonymous with the idea of a Hindu-dominated 
successor state to British India. 
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some would say ‘pseudo-secular’43 state; (2) that the Sikh leadership was offered independence 
and even union with Pakistan (which ‘officially’ included a proposed autonomous Sikh unit), 
but themselves opted for union with India instead; (3) the fact that Punjab was partitioned at all 
was arguably more out of British consideration for Sikh sentiments than the numerically larger 
Hindu Punjabi populace; and (4) that the demographic upheaval across Punjab, created in large 
part due the Sikh (and Muslim) leadership’s wishes and actions, actually resulted in the 
concentration of the Sikh population along the border districts of Punjab, which, while not 
resulting in a Sikh majority Khalistan as some may had hoped for, made the subsequent Punjabi 
suba movement vis-à-vis the Indian state a feasible one. 
 
Cultural Consequences of Partition 
Unlike economic, and to a lesser degree political, the cultural losses associated with Partition 
are, for obvious reasons, quite difficult to objectively assess. Nevertheless the common 
perception among Sikh refugees, as expressed in their memory of their exile, is that they and 
their community suffered the most in this respect.44 There are two factor commonly cited in this 
regard. 
The first factor in support of this is that Lahore, with its deep Sikh historical association, 
ended up in Pakistan.45 Although Lahore did indeed serve as the capital of Maharajah Ranjit 
Singh’s empire, it is also a city that had links with the Hindus and Muslims too. Consequently, 
it is purely a matter of opinion as to which community had the deepest association with it.  
The second factor, and one far more important than the first, is that, given the approximately 
150 important Sikh gurdwaras and religious sites46 (including Nankana Sahib) which ended up 
falling under Pakistani jurisdiction on the eve of partition, the proportion of significant holy 
land that the Sikhs lost surpassed that of the Hindus or Muslims.47 It is difficult to argue with the 
view that the Sikhs as a community lost proportionally was greater than that of the Hindus or 
Muslims. Though the extent of the Sikhs’ geographical remit was, historically speaking, 
subcontinent wide (and perhaps even beyond if one takes into account Guru Nanak’s travels 
to Baghdad), the overwhelming concentration of ‘historic events and memories’ occurred in 
and around the Punjab plains. Anthony Smith observes:
                                                
43 Many Hindus, typically those considered as falling within the ‘Hindu-right’ category, tend to hold this view. 
44 Grievances pertaining to the cultural losses resulting from Partition are not exclusive to the Sikh refugees. 
With the exception of those Sikh refugees who manned gurdwaras or lived in the direct vicinity of such sites/towns 
across West Pakistan, non-refugee Sikhs have near equal grounds for identifying with such losses within their own 
Partition memory. 
45 ‘Interview with Sardar Mangal Singh conducted by Dr Hari Dev Sharma’, Chandigarh, 21 June 1973, Acc 
No. 408 [Oral History Collection, Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Museum & Library, New Delhi], p. 159. 
46 The view that Punjab, owing to the existence of these shrines, stood as their holy land was expressed by 
politically active Sikhs prior to Partition (See Gyani Kartar Singh 1947: 1; see also Harnam Singh 1945: 64). 
47 See Vachan Kaur quoted in Verma 2004: 134; Interview with Tarlochan Singh, Delhi, 19 August 2010; 
Interview with Dr Mohinder Singh, Delhi, 21 August 2010; Interview with Paramjit Singh Sarna, Delhi, 21 August 
2010; Interview with Kuldip Nayar, Delhi, 29 August 2010. 
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The holy deeds of ‘our ancestors’ may also confer a sacred quality on an ethnoscape. These 
legendary or historical figures are venerated by the people for the benefits, material and spiritual, 
that they bestow on the community, and for the divine blessings they bring on the people. So the 
places where holy men and heroes walked and taught, fought and judged, prayed and died, are felt 
to be holy themselves; their tombs and monuments became places of veneration and pilgrimage, 
testifying to the glorious and sacred past of the ethnic community.48 
 
It was thus, ‘not the loss of territory tout court which provoke[d] the special pain, but the 
loss of territory [that was] situated within [their] imagined homeland’, namely Punjab.49 Though 
the Indus Valley was the cradle of Vedic philosophy and science, the cultural heartland of the 
Hindus had long shifted to the Gangetic belt (though clearly the division of Bharat Mata was 
undoubtedly extremely difficult painful for culturally conscious Hindus). As for the Muslims, 
the Pakistanis among them effectively ‘lost’ numerous Indo-Islamic cultural sites. However, 
because most Muslims remained behind in India, these sites did not suffer the dereliction to the 
same extent that non-Muslims sites in Pakistan did. 
 
Conclusion 
As this paper has demonstrated, the memory of Partition held by the Sikh refugees does indeed 
convey the view that ‘their’ people were the foremost victims of this episode. Though it is 
extraordinarily difficult for any scholar to quantify suffering on a ‘collective level’, especially so 
on a subject as sensitive as that of Partition, clearly there are many aspects to the Sikh refugee 
‘victimhood-rich’ memory with which it is difficult to refute. This is not to say that Sikh refugees 
were the foremost victims of Partition, but only that they have credible grounds to consider 
themselves as such. 
As far as the ‘usability’ of this memory is concerned, clearly it has served a practical and 
egotistical purpose for Sikh refugees within India, and no doubt it will also serve, as it has 
arguably already done so, a purpose for their non-refugee ethnic kin and also the refugee post-
event offspring who appropriate the memories held by the former. 
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